Atomic Cross-Chain Swaps with Improved Space and Local Time Complexity by Imoto, Soichiro et al.
Atomic Cross-Chain Swaps with Improved Space and Time
Complexity
Soichiro Imoto†, Yuichi Sudo†, Hirotsugu Kakugawa‡, and Toshimitsu Masuzawa†
†Osaka University
‡Ryukoku University
Abstract
An effective atomic cross-chain swap protocol is introduced by Herlihy [Herlihy, 2018] as a
distributed coordination protocol in order to exchange assets across multiple blockchains among
multiple parties. An atomic cross-chain swap protocol guarantees; (1) if all parties conform to
the protocol, then all assets are exchanged among parties, (2)even if some parties or coalitions
of parties deviate from the protocol, no party conforming to the protocol suffers a loss, and (3)
no coalition has an incentive to deviate from the protocol. Herlihy [Herlihy, 2018] invented this
protocol by using hashed timelock contracts.
A cross-chain swap is modeled as a directed graph D = (V,A). Vertex set V denotes a set
of parties and arc set A denotes a set of proposed asset transfers. Herlihy’s protocol uses the
graph topology and signature information to set appropriate hashed timelock contracts. The
space complexity of the protocol (i.e., the total number of bits written in the blockchains in a
swap) is O(|A|2). The time complexity of the protocol (i.e., the maximum execution time of a
contract in a swap to transfer the corresponding asset) is O(|V | · |L|), where L is a feedback
vertex set computed by the protocol.
We propose a new atomic cross-chain swap protocol which uses only signature information
and improve the space complexity to O(|A| · |V |) and the time complexity to O(|V |).
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The seminal work [2] by Nakamoto Satoshi in 2008 for developing bitcoins has attracted many
researchers to the research of blockchains. However, the blockchain has problems in privacy level,
increased transaction time and scalability. In order to overcome them, new cryptocurrencies with
a wide variety of advantages are developed. There are also blockchains that handle physical rights
as well as virtual currency (e.g., ownership of cars, copyrights of songs, proof of circulation and so
on) [3]. It is a great advantage of blockchains that it allows us to exchange them in the absence of
any trusted third parties.
As trading on blockchains become popular, demands for trading across multiple blockchains
increases [3]. As a specific example of exchanging assets across multiple blockchains among multiple
parties, considering the case that Alice wants to sell the copyrights of her songs for bitcoins. Bob
is willing to buy her copyrights with alt-coins. Carol wants to exchange alto-coins for bitcoins. An
atomic cross-chain swap protocol is a mechanism by which multiple parties exchange their assets
managed by multiple blockchains. It is common that some parties do not know and thus do not
trust each other, thus the protocol must guarantee that no party conforming to the protocol suffers
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from a loss in their trading. Specifically, this protocol guarantees the following three conditions. (1)
if all parties conform to the protocol, then all assets are exchanged among parties, (2) even if some
parties or coalitions of parties deviate from the protocol, no party conforming to the protocol suffers
a loss, and (3) no coalition has an incentive to deviate from the protocol. The more blockchain
users have request to trade as blockchain technology develops in the future, the more important
atomic cross-chain swaps are [10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
In many blockchains, assets are transferred from one party to another party by using smart
contracts. A smart contract is a program that runs on a blockchain and has its correct execution
enforced by the consensus protocol [4, 5]. In this paper, hashed timelock contracts (HTLCs) [6,
7] are used. In HTLC, recipients of a transaction have to acknowledge payment by generating
cryptographic proof within a certain timeframe. Otherwise, the transaction does not take place.
For example, consider the case Alice wants to send an asset to Bob by using HTLCs in gratitude for
taking money from Bob. Alice first generates random secret data s, called a secret, and produces
hashlock h = H(s), where H is a cryptographic hash function. Next, Alice publishes the contract
with hashlock h. After that, if Alice takes money form Bob, Alice reveals the secret s to Bob.
When Bob sends the secret s to the contract, the contract irrevocably transfers Alice’s asset to
Bob. Alice also sets timelock t so that her escrowed asset can be returned if Bob does not give
money to Alice within the time.
In this paper, we consider the case that more than two parties exchange their assets. In the
following, we quote a simple protocol presented by Herlihy [1] for exchanging assets among Alice,
Bob, and Carol, illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, in the Appendix. In that exchanging, Alice sends
the copyrights of her songs to Bob, Bob sends alt-coins to Carol and Carol sends bitcoins to Alice.
Let ∆ be enough time for one party to publish a smart contract on any of the blockchains, or to
change the state of a contract, and for the other party to detect the change.
· A simple protocol presented by Herlihy [1]
1. Alice creates a secret s, hashlock h = H(s), and publishes a contract on the music copyright
blockchain with hashlock h and timelock 6∆ in the future, to transfer her music copyrights
to Bob.
2. When Bob confirms that Alice’s contract has been published on the copyright blockchain, he
publishes a contract on the alt-coin blockchain with the same hashlock h but with timelock
5∆ in the future, to transfer his alt-coins to Carol.
3. When Carol confirms that Bob’s contract has been published on the alt-coin blockchain, she
publishes a contract on the Bitcoin blockchain with the same hashlock h, but with timelock
4∆ in the future, to transfer her bitcoins to Alice.
4. When Alice confirms that Carol’s contract has been published on the Bitcoin blockchain, she
sends the secret s to Carol’s contract, acquiring the bitcoins and revealing s to Carol.
5. Carol then sends s to Bob’s contract, acquiring the alt-coins and revealing s to Bob.
6. Bob sends s to Alice’s contract, acquiring the copyrights and completing the swap.
Everyone can stop the swap if published contracts are different from predetermined ones. There
is no possibility that the copyrights are transferred without acquiring the bitcoins because only Alice
initially knows secret s. If Carol’s bitcoins have been transferred, this guarantees that she can get
s and acquire the alt-coins as well because she publishes her contract after confirming deployment
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of Bob’s contract and the timeout of Bob’s contract is one ∆ greater than that of her contract.
Bob also acquires the copyrights if his alt-coins have transferred. Even if Alice and Bob collaborate
with each other, they can not get the bitcoins without payment for Carol, thus Carol never suffers
from a loss. As seen from these facts, every party can publish his contracts only if all the contracts
for assets transferred to him are published or he generates a secret for a swap. We call a party who
generates a secret for a swap a leader, and denote the set of leaders by L. From above discussion,
L must be a feedback vertex set. This simple protocol works if and only if we have exactly one
leader l such that {l} is a feedback set. .
Generally, a cross-chain swap is modeled as a directed graph D(V,A). Vertex set V denotes a set
of parties and arc set A denotes a set of proposed asset transfers. When there are multiple cycles,
this simple protocol does not work. For example, there are three parties all who want to exchange
each others in the swap, as illustrated in Figure 4, in the Appendix. The leader can publish his two
contracts without anxiety about a result of the swap. However, each of other two parties can not
publish his contracts until he confirms the other publishes a contract to him. Therefore, at least
one leader is necessary on each cycle of a swap graph. Moreover, if there are multiple cycles, it is
not possible to assign consistent timeouts across cycles in a way which guarantees a gap of at least
∆ between contracts for giving assets and those for taking assets. That is, it is not easy to realize a
mechanism such that each leader reveals its secret with confidence when there are multiple leaders.
Herlihy [1] sets complicated conditions for each smart contract to design an atomic cross-chain
swap protocol. In the Herlihy’s protocol, each leader creates a secret and one hashlock for each of
the |L| secrets is set in each contract. Each hashlock has its timelock, which depends on length of
the path which the secret is transferred along. It is necessary to check whether the path actually
exists in a given swap. Therefore, topology information of a swap graph is stored in every contract,
which requires O(|A|) bits.
1.2 Our contributions
Let D(V,A) be a given directed graph that represents a cross-chain swap to general graphs.
We propose an atomic cross-chain swap protocol, which improves the space complexity (bits stored
on all blockchains) of Herlihy’s protocol [1] from O(|A|2) to O(|A| · |V |), and the time complexity
(the maximum execution time of a contract in a swap to transfer the corresponding asset) from
O(|V | · |L|) to O(|V |). The protocol dose not store the swap topology in a contract. Instead,
it simply assigns each contract the timelock depending on the number of signatures of parties.
Specifically, we set the timelock of a contract as follows: the contract is triggered if and only if the
contract is given signatures of distinct x parties in a swap before time t + x∆ for some x ∈ [1, n]
where t is some time instance we will explain later (the starting time of the execution plus alpha).
Suppose that an asset of party v is transferred to another party by executing a contract. This
means that the signature of x parties are published in the corresponding blockchain before time
t+x∆. Then, party v can trigger all the contracts that transfer an asset to v because v can obtain
the signature of x parties from that blockchain and can give those contracts x + 1 signatures by
adding its own signature before time t + (x + 1)∆. As a result, it is not necessary to store the
topology information of a swap in any contract, thus the space complexity is improved.
In Herlihy’s protocol, a contract must verify at most |V | signatures for the hashlock of each
leader. Thus, we need Θ(|V | · |L|) time to trigger one contract. On the other hand, in the proposed
protocol, we only need to verify |L|(≤ |V |) secrets and at most |V | signatures. That is why the
proposed protocol improves time complexity from |V | · |L| to |V |. It is worthwhile to mention that
each contract is executed by all network nodes that host the copies of the ledger of the corresponding
blockchain. Therefore, reducing time complexity of a smart contract is of practical importance.
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2 Model
2.1 Graph Model
D(V,A) is a directed graph, where V is a finite set of vertexes, and A is a finite set of ordered
pairs of distinct vertexes called arcs. The number of vertexes |V | is denoted by n. An arc (u, v)
has tail u and head v. An arc leaves its tail and enters its head. Therefore, an arc (u, v) is leaving
arc from u and entering arc to v. A digraph D′ = (V ′, A′) is a subdigraph of D = (V,A) if V ′ ⊆ V ,
A′ ⊆ A ∩ (V ′ × V ′) .
A path p in D is a sequence of vertexes (v0, v1, ..., vk) with (vi, vi+1) ∈ A for every i = 0, 1, . . . , k−
1, where we define k as the length of the path. The distance dist(u, v) from vertex u to vertex v
is the length of the shortest path from u to v in D. D’s diameter diam(D) is the largest distance
between two vertexes in D. A vertex v is reachable from vertex u if there is a path from u to v.
Directed graph D is strongly connected if every vertex is reachable from any other vertex in D. A
path (u0, ..., uk) with k ≥ 1 is a cycle if u0 = uk. A feedback vertex set of D is a set of vertexes
whose removal makes a graph acyclic. By definition, any feedback vertex set contains at least one
vertex in any cycle in D.
2.2 Blockchain and Smart Contract Model
A blockchain is a distributed ledger that can record transactions between parties in a verifiable
and permanent way. We do not assume any specific blockchain algorithm. We only assume that
every blockchain used in a cross-chain swap supports smart contracts. An owner of an asset can
transfer ownership of the asset to a counterparty by creating a smart contract. The owner specifies
conditions in the contract to transfer the asset. A counterparty can get ownership of the asset
when the conditions are satisfied. We say that a contract is published when the owner of the
corresponding asset releases the contract on a blockchain. A contract is triggered when all conditions
of the contract are satisfied and the ownership of the asset on the contract is transferred to the
counterparty. The owner of an asset can also specify conditions to get back the asset on a smart
contract. If the conditions are satisfied before the contract is triggered, the asset is returned to the
owner. Thereafter, the asset is never transferred to the counterparty by this contract. Typically,
the owner can specify the condition to get back the asset in the form of timeout condition. The
owner can regain the asset anytime after the specified time in a contract. Smart contracts are
immutable, which means smart contracts can never be changed and no one can tamper with or
break the contract. We assume that every atomic operation on any blockchain can be completed
within a known amount of time ∆. In particular, every party can publish a contract within ∆ unit
time and every party can trigger a contract within ∆ unit time (if he has all information to satisfy
all conditions of the contract). Blockchains require each party v to create the public key pkeyv and
the private key skeyv for transactions. A signature sign(x, v) is the the signature on data x signed
with skeyv. Every party can verify the signature sign(x, v) with the public key pkeyv.
2.3 Swap model
Parties v1, v2, . . . , vn are given a digraph D = (V,A), where each vertex in V represents a party,
and each arc (u, v) ∈ A represents an asset on a blockchain to be transferred from party u to party
v. When ownership of an asset on an arc (u, v) transfers from u to v, we say the asset transfer
happens, or the arc is triggered.
We denote the corresponding asset for arc (u, v) ∈ A as au,v. The value of each asset may
vary from one party to another; for example, v may find a higher value on the asset than u.
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Otherwise, that is, if all the parties see the same value about an asset, exchanging their assets
following D = (V,A) is meaningless (no one can gain unless someone loses.). The value of au,v
for u (resp. v) is denoted by value−u,v (resp. value+u,v). We define value
+
D,v as the sum of the
values for v of all entering arcs to v in D, i.e., value+D,v =
∑
(u,v)∈A value
+
u,v. We also define
value−v,D =
∑
(v,u)∈A value
−
v,u as the sum of the values for v of all leaving arcs from v in D.
We assume that D meets the following condition because otherwise party v should not partici-
pate in a swap D.
∀v ∈ V : value+D,v > value−v,D
Moreover, we assume that there exists no connected subgraph D′ = (V ′, A) of D such that
∃C ⊂ V ′ : (
∑
v′∈C
(value+D′,v′ − value−v′,D′) >
∑
v′∈C
(value+D,v′ − value−v′,D)) (1)
∧(∀v′′ /∈ C : value+D′,v′′ − value−v′′,D′ ≥ value+D,v′′ − value−v′′,D). (2)
Inequality (1) means that one coalition C in D′ gets more benefits in D′ than D, and (2) means
that any party in D′ − C gets equal to or more benefits in D′ than D. If swap D has such a
subgraph D′, we can say that D forces C to perform irrational exchanges because C gets larger
benefits in swap D′. Therefore, D is not an appropriate swap. This is the reason why we exclude
such a swap. As we will explain in Section 5, this assumption is weaker than the assumption that
Herlihy [1] makes to guarantee that no party and coalition can get more benefits by deviating from
the protocol than following the protocol. Even without this assumption, the proposed protocol is
an atomic cross-chain swap protocol under another specific assumption about value function which
Herlihy’s protocol requires. We discuss that in the Section 5.
A protocol is a strategy for a party, that is, a set of rules that determines which action the party
takes. Ideally, all parties in a swap D = (V,A) follows the common protocol P . However, we must
consider the case that some party does not follow (i.e, deviates from) the common protocol to get
larger benefits. To make the matter worse, those parties may make a coalition and take actions
cooperatively to get larger benefits in total (some party in the coalition willingly loses aiming at
larger total benefits of the coalition) . We must design a protocol such that any party following
the protocol does not suffer from a loss even if such selfish parties or coalitions exist. We assume
that every party in a swap D = (V,A) can send any message to any party in the swap. Space
complexity of a protocol is measured by the total number of bits required store information on all
blockchains in a swap. Time complexity of a protocol is measured by the maximum execution time
of a contract in a swap to transfer the corresponding asset.
Definition 2.1. A swap protocol P is uniform if it guarantees the followings:
• If all parties follow P , all arcs in D = (V,A) are triggered.
• Even if there are parties arbitrarily deviating from P , every party v following P gets all assets
of entering arcs to v or regains all assets of leaving arcs from v.
Definition 2.2. A swap protocol P is Nash equilibrium if no party can get more benefits by
deviating from P than following P unless he joins a coalition.
Definition 2.3. A swap protocol P is strong Nash equilibrium if it guarantees that no party and
coalition can get more benefits by deviating from P than following P .
Definition 2.4. A swap protocol P is atomic if it guarantees to be uniform and strong Nash
equilibrium.
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3 Proposed protocol
3.1 Outline of proposed protocol
The proposed protocol P consists of four phases. In Phase 1, every party finds a common
feedback vertex set L of D = (V,A) locally by using the same algorithm. Although finding a
minimum feedback vertex set is NP-hard [8], we do not need the minimum set, thus we can use
any approximate solution. For example, there exists an algorithm to find a 2-approximate solution
[9]. The parties belonging to the vertex set L = {l1, l2, . . . , lk} are called leaders. We call the other
parties f1, f2, . . . , fn−k followers. In this phase, every leader generates a secret which is a random
bit string and calculates a hashlock based on the secret. In Phase 2, a smart contract corresponding
to each arc of D is published. Each leader spontaneously publishes contracts for all his leaving arcs.
Each follower publishes contracts for all his leaving arcs after confirming that the contracts for all
his entering arcs are already published. In Phase 3, each of the leaders l2, l3, . . . , lk sends its secret
to l1 after confirming that the contracts for all its entering arcs have been published. The leader l1
starts Phase 4 after l1 confirms that the contracts for all the entering arcs to l1 have been published
and all secret have been sent from each other leaders. In Phase 4, each arc of D is sequentially
triggered, which starts from leader l1.
As described in Section 3.2, we design the contracts in Phase 2 so as to guarantee the following
three properties. (i) For any arc, no party can trigger the corresponding contract without knowing
the secrets of all leaders. (ii) For any party v, if a contract on leaving arc from v is triggered, v
can trigger the contracts published on all entering arcs to v. (iii) For any arc (u, v), party v can
regain au,v if the contract on (u, v) are not triggered during a certain period after it was published.
If a leader li follows the proposed protocol, li sends its secret to the leader l1 after confirming that
the contracts on all entering arcs have been published. Therefore, from Property (i) and (ii), it
is guaranteed that no leaving arc from li is triggered unless all entering arcs to li are triggered.
Moreover, from property (iii), after a certain period of time, li gets assets of all entering arcs to
li, or regains assets of all leaving arcs from li. If a follower fi follows the proposed protocol, fi
publishes the contracts for all leaving arcs after confirming that the contracts for all entering arcs
have been published. Therefore, according to the same argument, after a certain period of time, fi
gets assets of all entering arcs to fi, or regains assets of all leaving arcs from fi.
In the following, we describe the trigger condition and regain condition of the smart contract
in Section 3.2, and the detailed operation in Phases 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6,
respectively. We describe codes for a smart contract, and the behaviors of the the leader l1, the
other leaders l2, l3, . . . , lk and followers in the Appendix. We distinguish entering arcs to each party
v by locally labeling those with (1, v), (2, v), ..., (p, v) where p is the number of the entering arcs.
We also label leaving arcs from each party v with (v, 1), (v, 2), ..., (v, q) where q is the number of
the leaving arcs. In the codes, we abbreviate Smart Contract to SC.
3.2 The conditions of smart contracts
In this subsection, we specify what each party writes in a contract. In a contract, its publisher
specifies the conditions for transferring and regaining the asset. Each leader li makes hashlock
H(si) = hi with random secret data si, called a secret, where H() is a cryptographic hash function
common to all parties. In any blockchain, as mentioned in Section 2.2, time ∆ is enough to publish
and trigger a contract. The condition of the contract on arc (u, v) to transfer asset au,v is as
follows: Asset au,v is transferred to counterparty v if v sends the secrets s1, s2, . . . , sk of all leaders
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and x signatures 1 on k-tuple (s1, s2, . . . , sk) by arbitrary x parties to the contract before time
ts + ((diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2ε) + x∆, where ts is the starting time of the protocol. That is, the more
a party collects the signatures of the parties, the later he can trigger the contracts on his entering
arcs. Let ε(<< ∆) be the time required to complete each of Phases 1 and 3. We set the deadline
of the smart contract to time ts + ((diam(D) + 1)∆ + ε) +n∆, so that the publisher can regain his
asset on the contract if the corresponding contract is not triggered before that time.
3.3 Phase 1 : Preparation
Every party takes D = (V,A) as input. At first, he chooses leaders l1, l2, . . . , lk such that the
leaders form a feedback vertex set of D. Since all parties are given the same swap D = (V,A) as
input, they can independently find the same leaders l1, l2, . . . , lk without communication. We call
l1 the top leader and the other leaders l2, l3, ..., lk sub-leaders.
Next, each leader li generates a sequence of random bits si called a secret and computes hashlock
hi = H(si), after which it sends only the hashlock to all parties. Finally, all parties send their public
keys pkeyv1 , pkeyv2 , ..., pkeyvn for verifying their signatures. We assume that all of these can be
done in time ε ∆.
3.4 Phase 2 : Publication
Every leader spontaneously publishes contracts for all their leaving arcs with the conditions
described in Section 3.2.
When a follower finds that the contracts on all his entering arcs are already published, he checks
whether the contents of the contracts are consistent with the conditions of Section 3.2. Especially,
he checks whether the public keys of all the parties and the hashlocks of all leaders that he receives
in Phase 1 match the public keys of all parties and the hashlocks of all leaders specified in the
contracts on entering arcs. He quits the swap without publishing any contract if those public keys
or hashlocks do not match. Thus, even if the party deviating from P may send a fake hashlock or
a public key to the other parties in Phase 1, no other party following P suffers from a loss. If all
the published contracts are consistent, he publishes contracts for all his leaving arcs. As will be
described later, each party v reveals the signature on s1, s2, . . . , sk with v’s secret key skeyv only
when v triggers all entering arcs. Therefore, all entering arcs of v can be triggered if any leaving
arc of v is triggered. Hence, no follower suffers from a loss, that is, every follower gets assets of all
his entering arcs or regains assets of all his leaving arcs.
As described in Section 4, Phase 2 can be completed within at most (diam(D) + 1)∆ time.
3.5 Phase 3 : Share secrets
Every sub-leader reveals his secret to the top-leader if the contracts are published on all his
entering arcs. This is to ensure that the top-leader can trigger contracts at first in Phase 4.
The top-leader confirms whether or not the secrets acquired from the sub-leaders are correct
using hashlocks shared at Phase 1. If the top-leader finds an incorrect secret, it quits the swap
without going to Phase 4.
We assume that Phase 3 can be done in time ε ∆.
1sign((s1, s2, . . . , sk), v1), sign((s1, s2, . . . , sk), v2), . . . , sign((s1, s2, . . . , sk), vx))
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3.6 Phase 4 : Trigger
The top-leader starts Phase 4 if he acquires the secrets of all the sub-leaders within time
(diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2ε which is enough to complete Phases 1, 2 and 3. This is because the top-
leader only need to send secrets of all leaders s1, s2, ..., sk and its signature within the time ts +
((diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2ε) + ∆ to all his entering arcs in order to get the assets of all his entering arcs.
The top-leader sends these secrets and his signature to all his entering arcs, by which he triggers
the contracts and acquires all assets of the entering arcs.
If the top-leader deviates from P , he may not trigger some (or all) contracts that transfer assets
to the top leader. However, those actions are irrational. We explain the reason in Lemma 4.8,
(Section 4).
Next, we describe the behavior of the sub-leaders and followers in Phase 4. Each party v
of them waits until any of his leaving arcs is triggered. Consider that one of his leaving arcs is
triggered with the information of the secrets s1, s2, . . . , sk and the signature of x distinct parties
(1 ≤ x < n) on k-tuple (s1, s2, . . . , sk). By definition of contracts, the leaving arc must be triggered
before ts + (diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2 + x∆. Then, party v acquires from the contract the secrets
s1, s2, . . . , sk and those x signatures within time ts + (diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2ε+ x∆. He immediately
sends s1, s2, . . . , sk and the x signatures in addition to his signature (thus x+ 1 signatures in total)
to all entering arcs. As a result, v sends all necessary information to the contracts on all his entering
arcs before time ts + ((diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2ε+ (x+ 1)∆, which guarantees that all his entering arcs
are triggered. We describe these in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The party v can trigger all his entering arcs when a leaving arc is triggered.
Every party regains the asset of each of leaving arcs if it is not triggered by the deadline (specified
by the timeout) ts + (diam(D) + n+ 1)∆ + 2ε.
4 Correctness and Complexity of Protocol
We prove that proposed protocol P is atomic (i.e., uniform and strong Nash equilibrium). First,
we prove that P is uniform.
Lemma 4.1. Assume that top-leader l1 follows P . If any leaving arc of l1 is triggered, all of
entering arcs to l1 are triggered.
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Proof. Assume for contradiction that there is an execution of P such that a leaving arc (l1, v) of
the top-leader l1 is triggered and an entering arc (u, l1) is not triggered. After (l1, v) is triggered,
l1 immediately obtains secrets of all leaders, which is before the time ts + diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2ε.
Thus, l1 sends all the secrets and its own signature to the contract on (u, l1) before the time
ts + diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2ε, which means that l1 triggers (u, l1) in the execution. This contradicts
the assumption.
Lemma 4.2. Assume that sub-leader li(i 6= 1) follows P . If any leaving arc of li is triggered, all
of entering arcs to li are triggered.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there is an execution of P such that a leaving arc (li, v) of
sub-leader li is triggered but an entering arc (u, li) is not triggered. All secrets s1, s2, ..., sk and
the signature of x(< n) parties are revealed in the contract of (li, v) by time ts + (diam(D) +
x + 1)∆ + 2ε. By the assumption, those x signatures do not include the signature of li because
li reveals its signature only when it triggers the contracts of all entering arcs. The contract on
(li, v) requires the secret of all leaders and li does not reveal its secret si until the contracts of
all its entering arcs are published. Therefore, the contracts of all entering arcs of li are published
before time ts + (diam(D) + x + 1)∆ + 2ε. From the above, li sends the secrets s1, s2, . . . , sk and
the x signatures in addition to its signature on s1, s2, . . . , sk to the contract on (u, li) by time
ts + (diam(D) + x+ 1)∆ + 2ε. This implies that edge (u, li) is triggered in the execution. This is
a contradiction.
Lemma 4.3. Assume that follower f follows P . If any leaving arc of f is triggered, all of entering
arcs to f are triggered.
Proof. Follower f publishes a contract for a leaving arc from f only after the contracts of all entering
arcs to f are published. Therefore, all entering arcs to f are already published when any leaving
arc from f is triggered. We can prove the lemma in the same way as the proof of Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.4. Assume that party v follows P . If any leaving arc of v is triggered, all of entering
arcs to v are triggered.
Proof. The lemma immediately follows from Lemmas 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3
Lemma 4.5. Let SC be the smart contract published on any leaving arc from party v that follows
P . It happens before time ts + (diam(D) + n+ 2)∆ + 2 that contract SC is triggered or the asset
of SC is regained by v.
Proof. If a leaving arc from v is not triggered before time ts + (diam(D) + n + 1)∆ + 2ε, party v
calls the timeout function of the contract on the arc within at most ∆ unit time after the deadline
ts + (diam(D) + n+ 1)∆ + 2ε.
Lemma 4.6. If every party follows P , all arcs are triggered within the time ts+2(diam(D)+1)∆+
2ε.
Proof. If all parties follow P , each leader l immediately publishes contracts for all leaving arcs from
l after the start of Phase 2, and each follower f publishes contracts for all leaving arcs from f
immediately after the contracts for all entering arcs to f are published. Since the time required to
publish each contract is at most ∆, we can see that all parties complete Phase 2 in (diam(D)+1)∆
time. Therefore, since the upper bound ε of the time is required for the local computation and the
message transmission of Phases 1 and 3, Phase 3 is completed by time ts + (diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2ε.
Thus, top-leader l1 will immediately begin Phase 4.
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After Phase 4 has started, the leader l1 immediately triggers the contracts of all entering arcs
to l1. Each party v other than l1 immediately triggers the contracts of all entering arcs to v, once
a contract on any leaving arc from v has been triggered. The signature on (s1, s2, . . . , sk) by v is
never used to trigger the contract on the arc which is triggered for the first time among all leaving
arcs from v. Therefore, v triggers all entering arcs to v by using the signatures used to trigger the
leaving arc and his own signatures. Since the time required to trigger each contract is at most ∆,
we can show, by the induction on distance from top-leader l1, that the time required to trigger the
contracts on all arcs in a given swap in Phase 4 is at most (diam(D)+1)∆. Summing up these time
for Phases 1 to 4, we can show that all arcs are triggered by time ts + 2(diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2ε.
Lemma 4.7. Protocol P is uniform.
Proof. The lemma immediately follows from Lemmas 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6
Lemma 4.8. Protocol P is strong Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that, in an execution of P , a coalition C formed from some parties
gets more profits by deviating from protocol P when the other parties follow P . That is, for C, the
profits gained by D′ is bigger than that C gets with D, where D′ = (V ′, A′) is the subgraph of D
induced by all arcs triggered in the execution. In other words, the following inequality holds:
∑
v∈C(value
+
D′,v − value−v,D′) >
∑
v∈C(value
+
D,v − value−v,D)
Every party in V ′ \ C triggers all his entering arcs by Lemma 4.4. Therefore, all entering arcs
to v′ in V ′\C are included in A′. Therefore, the following inequality holds for every party v′ ∈ V ′\C.
∀v′ ∈ V ′ \ C : value+D′,v′ − value−v′,D′ = value+D,v′ − value−v′,D′ ≥ value+D,v′ − value−v′,D
However, these condition contradicts the assumption on a swap D = (V,A) introduced in Section
2.3.
Theorem 4.1. Protocol P is an atomic cross-chain swaps protocol. If every party follows P , the
swap can be completed in time 2(diam(D)+1)∆+2ε. Even if any set of parties deviates from P , the
swap finishes in at most time (diam(D) + n+ 1)∆ + 2ε. Protocol P requires space complexity (the
total number of bits on all the blockchains) of O(|A| · · · |V |). Protocol P requires time complexity
(the maximum execution time of a contract in a swap to transfer the corresponding asset) of O(|V |).
Proof. Protocol P is atomic by Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8. The execution time of P follows from Lemmas
4.5 and 4.6. Space complexity of P is O(|A|·|V |) because each arc has one contract and each contract
requires public keys of |V | parties and hashlocks of |L| ≤ |V | leaders. Time complexity of P is
O(|V |) because we only need to verify |L|(≤ |V |) secrets and at most |V | signatures.
5 Discussion
We made two assumptions, in Section 2.3, on the value function specifying the values of assets
to parties. Remind that, we assume that for any subgraph D′ of D, no coalition C in D′ gets more
benefits in D′ than D when every other party in D′ gets benefits in D′ no less than in D.
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The first alternative is to replace coalition C in the above assumption with just a party v. That
is, we assume that for any subgraph D′ of D, no party v in D′ gets more benefits in D′ than D
when every other party in D′ gets benefits in D′ no less than in D. Under this assumption, the
proposed protocol P is not strong Nash equilibrium but is Nash equilibrium, which can be proved
in the same way as Lemma 4.8.
The second alternative is the assumption that Herlihy made for his protocol [1]: every (rational)
party never accepts the case that one of his entering arc is not triggered but one of his leaving arc
is triggered (He call this case UNDER WATER). That is, for any party v and any subgraph
D′ = (V ′, A′) of D, the benefit of v in D′ is defined as value+D′,v − value−v,D′ + exp(D′, v) where the
exception value exp(D′, v) is defined as follows: exp(D′, v) = −∞ if there exist arc (u, v) ∈ A \ A′
and arc (v, w) ∈ A′, otherwise exp(D′, v) = 0. In what follows, we show that our protocol P is
strong Nash equilibrium under this assumption. Assume for contradiction that, in an execution of
P , some coalition C gets more benefits by deviating from protocol P than by conforming to P . Let
D′ = (V ′, A′) be the subgraph of D induced by the set of the arcs triggered in the execution. Since
we introduce the exception value, every party in C must trigger all his entering arcs in D if one of
his leaving arc in D is triggered. Since D is strongly connected, if there exists an arc (u, v) ∈ A′,
there exists an arc (v, w) ∈ A′, thus all entering arcs to v are included in A′. Therefore, every
entering arc of every party in V ′ is included in A′, which implies D = D′. This contradicts the
assumption that C gets more benefits in D′ than in D.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed an atomic cross-chain protocol to improve space complexity and
time complexity. Herlihy’s protocol [1] requires to store the swap topology in each contract and
set timelocks to each secret by using the topology. The proposed protocol need not store the swap
topology in any contract. Instead, we set the time condition to trigger a contract depending on the
number of signatures sent to the contract. Therefore, every party v can immediately trigger the
contracts of all entering arcs to v, once a contract on some leaving arc from v is triggered. This is
because the signature of v is not included in the signatures used to trigger the leaving contract.
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Appendix
Algorithm 1 Contents of smart contract
1: Swap Contract
2: int h1, h2, . . . , hk;
3: int pkey1, pkey2, . . . , pkeyn
4: address party;
5: address counterparty;
6: uint start = protocol starting time;
7:
8: function transfer(int s1, s2, . . . , sk, int sig1, sig2, . . . , sigk)
9: require (msg.sender == counterparty);
10: if H(si) = hi holds for all i = 1, 2, . . . , k and
there exist x distinct parties u1, u2, . . . , ux in V such that sig1, sig2, . . . , sigx are correct signa-
ture on s1, s2, . . . , sk by u1, u2, . . . , ux respectively and
now < start+ (diam(D) + x+ 1)∆ + ε
11: then transfer asset to counterparty;
12: halt;
13: end if
14:
15: function timeout()
16: require (msg.sender == party);
17: if now > start+ (diam(D) + n+ 1)∆ + ε
18: then return asset to party;
19: halt;
20: end if
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Figure 2: Alice, Bob and Carol publish smart contracts on blockchains
Figure 3: They acquire assets by sending secret s to smart contracts in each time
Figure 4: A case of only one leader in multiple cycles
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Algorithm 2 Behavior of top-leader l1
1: Phase 1
2: determine a feedback vertexes set (l1, l2, . . . , lk);
3: create secret s1 and hashlock h1 = H(s1);
4: broadcast h1 to all parties (including l1 itself);
5: broadcast pkeyl1 to all parties (including l1 itself);
6: receive each hashlock hi from each leader li with 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
7: receive each public key pkeyi from each party vi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
8:
9: Phase 2
10: create and publish SC for all leaving arcs from l1;
11:
12: Phase 3
13: receive each secret si from each leader li with 2 ≤ i ≤ k;
14: if ∃i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , k} : H(si) 6= hior∃j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}: a consistent contract is not published on
arc (j, l1) or now ≥ start+ (diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2ε
15: then goto Regain;
16: end if
17: if ∃i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p} : (i, l1) don’t have SC
18: then goto Regain;
19: end if
20:
21: Phase 4
22: sigl1 ← my signature on (s1, s2, . . . , sk);
23: for i = 1 to p
24: call function transfer((s1, s2, . . . , sk),(sigl1)) for the contract on (i, l1);
25: end for
26: halt;
27:
28: Regain
29: Wait until now > start+ (diam(D) + n+ 1)∆ + 2ε;
30: call function timeout() for the contracts on all non-triggered leaving arcs from l1;
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Algorithm 3 Behavior of sub-leader lj
1: Phase 1
2: determine a feedback vertexes set (l1, l2, . . . , lk);
3: create secret sj and hashlock hj = H(sj);
4: broadcast hj to all parties (including lj itself);
5: broadcast pkeylj to all parties (including lj itself);
6: receive each hashlock hi from each leader li with 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
7: receive each public key pkeyi from each party vi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
8:
9: Phase 2
10: create and publish SC for all leaving arcs from lj ;
11:
12: Phase 3
13: Wait until ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}: a consistent contract is published on arc (i, lj);
14: if now > start+ (diam(D) + 1)∆ + 2ε;
15: then goto Regain;
16: end if
17: send sj to top-leader l1;
18:
19: Phase 4
20: Wait until any leaving arc is triggered or now > start+ (diam(D) + n+ 1)∆ + 2ε;
21: if now > start+ (diam(D) + n+ 1)∆ + 2ε
22: then goto Regain;
23: else get s1, s2, . . . , sk and sig1, sig2, . . . , sigx from the triggered arc;
24: siglj ← my signature on (s1, s2, . . . , sk);
25: for i = 1 to p
26: call function transfer((s1, s2, . . . , sk),(sig1, sig2, . . . , sigxandsiglj )) for the contract on (i, lj);
27: end for
28: halt;
29: end if
30:
31: Regain
32: Wait until now > start+ (diam(D) + n+ 1)∆ + 2ε;
33: call function timeout() for the contracts on all non-triggered leaving arcs from lj ;
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Algorithm 4 Behavior of follower f
1: Phase 1
2: determine a feedback vertexes set (l1, l2, . . . , lk);
3: broadcast pkeyf to all parties (including lj itself);
4: receive each hashlock hi from each leader li with 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
5: receive each public key pkeyf from each party vi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
6:
7: Phase 2
8: Wait until all entering arcs have SC or now > start+ (diam(D) + 1)∆ + ε;
9: if now > start+ (diam(D) + 1)∆ + ε
10: then goto Regain;
11: else create and publish SC for all leaving arcs from f ;
12: end if
13:
14: Phase 3
15:
16: Phase 4
17: Wait until any leaving arc is triggered or now > start+ (diam(D) + n+ 1)∆ + 2ε;
18: if now > start+ (diam(D) + n+ 1)∆ + 2ε
19: then goto Regain;
20: else get s1, s2, . . . , sk and sig1, sig2, . . . , sigx from the triggered arc;
21: sigf ← my signature on (s1, s2, . . . , sk);
22: for i = 1 to p
23: call function transfer((s1, s2, . . . , sk),(sig1, sig2, . . . , sigxandsigf )) for the contract on (i, f);
24: end for
25: halt;
26: end if
27:
28: Regain
29: Wait until now > start+ (diam(D) + n+ 1)∆ + 2ε;
30: call function timeout() for the contracts on all non-triggered leaving arcs from f ;
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